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A new future for social security: response to the
consultation document
Professor Paul Spicker
1.   This submission covers general issues related to the statement of principles, broader issues
of policy and general administrative arrangements.  The key points are these:
! The aims of benefit systems are complex.  Oversimplification threatens to
compromise important principles. (paras 5-7)
! Terminology can be tested to see if it has unexpected implications. (para 11)
! Benefits are only one form of support; sometimes direct provision is preferable.
(para 13)
! If benefits are to get to the right people, entitlement needs to be clearer and the
terms on which benefits are delivered need to be less sensitive to personal
differences.  (para 22). 
! It should not be assumed that citizens must register claims before they can
receive benefits. (paras 3, 21)
! Aspects of administration can be delegated to third sector agencies (paras 14,
15)
! There have to be systems for independent scrutiny, rapid review and redress.
(paras 17, 18, 23, 24)
! Interactions with other benefits should be avoided. (paras 7, 8, 25, 26)
! Transitional arrangements create complexities.  They can be avoided by buying
out rights. (paras 19, 20)
This submission does not include proposals for specific benefits: those will be discussed at
future events.
I  The statement of principles
A Claimant Charter?
2.  The statement of principles puts considerable emphasis on the sensitive use of language. 
Beyond that, the Scottish Government will need to consider the appropriate terminology, 
because some words and phrases carry implicit assumptions.  
3. One of the key assumptions made in the description of people as ‘claimants’ is that they will
be making a claim.  The assumption made about almost all benefits is that they are a
“subjective right”, which can only be exercised through the initiative of the potential
beneficiary or a person acting directly on their behalf.  There are similar assumptions in the
statement of outcomes, which refer more than once to the process of registering a claim and
satisfying an administrative process.  The process of claiming creates barriers to service
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delivery and receipt: we do not go to people who may have suffered a heart attack and ask,
“would you like to fill this form to register a claim for medical services?" The scope for
automatic issue of benefits is considered in para 21 of this submission.
4. A more appropriate name for the “Claimant Charter” might therefore be, “A Charter of
Rights to Social Security.”  
The statement of “outcomes”
5. The ‘outcomes’ described on page 16 include general principles (e.g. dignity,
empowerment, entitlement), elements of process and method (e.g. person-centred, targeting,
choice), and outcomes (e.g. on poverty, inequality, resilience).  Process and method should
not be fixed in a statement of principle, because methods may need to be reconsidered as
circumstances change.  
6. The aims of social security provision are complex and while it is understandable that
government might look for a well-ordered presentation, there are dangers in adopting any
simple formula.  In relation to disability, for example, the consultation notes, correctly, that
current tests of eligibility use care and mobility as ‘proxies’ for the impact of a disabling
condition and extra costs (pp 39-40), but those are not the only aims which have to be met.
They include, amongst others:
! raising low income
! social protection/insurance
! support for carers
! special needs, such as mobility
! extra costs
! support while out of work
! compensation for injury
! compensation for long term low income
! support for rehabilitation
! promoting employment
! desert, and
! paying for social care.
Any reform that is based on a small handful of principles, such as extra costs and care needs, 
is likely to override others that are equally valid. 
7. The suggestion that the social security system should be “effectively integrated with other
services to give a person centred service” is well-intentioned but it may be inappropriate.  
Person-centred benefits are intrinsically complex, and there are times when universal,
impersonal benefits are to be preferred.
8. Money payments are ‘fungible’; they can be mixed together from different sources, and
becomes indistinguishable in practice from those sources once received.   It will almost
certainly be better if the service is not “aligned” with the reserved system, but stand apart from
it, so that benefits delivered in Scotland were not affected by the rules for reserved benefits or
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vice versa.  
The use of language
9. The consultation asks whether certain words or phrases should be avoided. Attempts to
change stigmatising language rarely succeed, if the condition they refer to is itself stigmatised.1 
In the past, expressions which have been introduced in the hope of marking a new beginning -
Unemployment Benefit, National Assistance, Supplementary Benefit, Invalidity Benefit - have
come into disfavour in their turn.   The last three UK governments have taken to using the
word ‘welfare’ in the American sense to refer to social assistance, and that term should
probably be avoided on that basis.  
10. “Customers” are often referred to; the term was favoured by the DWP until recently, on
the grounds that it could help to orient their work towards personal service.  Customers have
a relationship with providers that is voluntary and contingent; one of the main options that
customers have is the option of exit.  The term is not well-chosen; it fails to describe the
relationship between citizen and social security provision.  
11. Other terms, such as benefits, allowances, and pensions, are well understood and can
probably be used without marked problems.  It is probably true that “pensions” are understood
to be long-term, and if the Scottish Government wished to introduce a long-term benefit for
people with disabilities, it is plausible to suppose that it might be called a ‘disability pension’ (a
term which is not currently used in the system).  Rather than simply assuming the implications
of such terminology, however, it may be helpful to use existing empirical tests (such as the
‘semantic differential’) to determine whether a term actually does have positive or negative
connotations.
II Devolved Benefits
12. The Scotland Act does not, despite appearances, devolve responsibility for specific
benefits; it devolves only the power to deliver benefits in general terms, without either a
requirement to deliver those benefits on specific terms, or any direct effect on the powers of
UK central government to deliver benefits in the same area.  The combination of Scotland's
new powers, to create supplements to reserved benefits and new benefits within the scope of
devolved responsibility, makes it possible for the Scottish Parliament to consider different
patterns of delivery from the existing system.  
Cash or kind
13. In its nature, social security delivers cash benefits, so that people can buy appropriate
goods and services in the economic market.  In many circumstances there is a choice to be
made between providing the service - free school meals, prescriptions - and offering people
social security payments instead.  (Some European systems give cash support for health care,
rather than providing medical services directly.)  There are occasions when services might be
1  See P Spicker, 1984, Stigma and social welfare, Beckenham: Croom Helm.
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given in place of cash - for example, funeral payments could be addressed by providing
facilities for burial or cremation, rather than through cash payments.  It does not follow,
however, that the social security agency should deliver the goods itself; the decision needs to
be taken at a higher level by the Scottish Government.
The engagement of other agencies in service delivery
14. The system of social security in the UK has developed primarily as a system of social
rights established and delivered by government agencies.  By contrast, many of the systems in
continental Europe offer particular rather than general rights - rights based in individual
contracts between individuals and autonomous social security agencies, often operated by
employers, trades unions or third sector bodies.  The Scotland Act denies to the Scottish
Government a range of activities that are open to independent agencies in the third sector - but
by the same token, it may be open to the Scottish Government to foster arrangements of that
sort.
15. It is possible to envisage circumstances where the Scottish Social Security Agency
attempted to establish a nationwide service, with accessible outlets for every community; but
the scope of the agency would need to be extensive, diffuse and extremely expensive.  Several
factors argue against this - the limited remit of the devolved benefits, the geographical
dispersion of the population and the need to respond to limited capacity relating to daily
activities.  There is a good case to extend the Agency’s administrative capacity by delegating
activity to selected providers.  Examples might include
! accepting identification and verification evidence from trusted providers, such
as a housing provider, a local authority or an advice agency.  (In France this
work is recompensed on a fee-for-case basis.)
! encouraging providers or local government to provide access to IT, document
copying, telephone links and postal addresses
! delegating personal interviews or domiciliary support to such providers where
they have contact with the individual.
These are all examples of providing supplementary services directly to people who engage
with social security.  This is not the same as privatisation of whole functions (as in the Work
Programme), where private operators have strong incentives to select which operations they
focus on.     
Independent scrutiny
16. Social security legislation is complex - often unnecessarily so.  Fimister comments that 
"there is a certain macho 'complexity culture' pervading the drafting of benefit law ...
As an article in the Law Society Gazette put it ... 'Cross-references – to sub-sections,
to other sections, to schedules, to a myriad of regulations and indeed to other Acts
proliferate. One finds exceptions to exceptions. Double and even triple negatives
almost seem like a badge of honour: No self–respecting section is complete without
one’…Or as Lord Justice Glidewell put it, in a case concerning the severe disability
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premium…'it is deplorable that legislation which affects some of the most
disadvantaged people in society should be couched in language which is so difficult for
even a lawyer trained and practising in this field to understand.’"2
The revised schedule 5 of the Scotland Act is an illustration.
 
17. The Scottish Parliament has limited capacity to subject regulations to detailed scrutiny and
some form of examination is essential.  In the UK national system, this work is done by the
independent Social Security Advisory Committee.  The SSAC is not a perfect model.  Its self-
imposed emphasis on consensus reports undermines the role of its experts, and the committee
consequently declines to record significant disagreements that elected policy-makers should be
aware of.  Nevertheless, if there were no such body the quality of legislation would be
impaired. 
18. Subsequent scrutiny depends on systems of redress, primarily the Scottish Public Services
Ombudsman and the courts.  Both systems have their weaknesses.  The marked expansion of
the scope of the SPSO and its slow rate of response makes it inappropriate for redress for
individual claimants.  The courts are expensive and complex.  Both systems are of course
within the power of the Scottish Parliament to refine and improve.  There needs to be rapid
recourse to justice.  To be consistent with the principles of natural justice, it must offer
citizens the opportunity to make their case and hear the arguments put against them.      
 
Transitional arrangements.
19. The consultation document mentions rightly the need to ensure a smooth transition in the
operation of benefits.  Any alteration or improvement in the structure of benefits is likely to
make some people better off, and others worse off. Any change which makes some people
better off can only be done without making someone else worse off if the total level of
expenditure increases.  There is a tendency, too, for reforms to be limited by the ‘laid table’ -
the sense that whatever exists is justifiable and must be maintained in the future.  
20. Transitional arrangements can have the unfortunate effect of adding to the complexity and
unfairness of the system - examples include the retention of pre-1996 rules in Housing Benefit
or the unequal treatment of claimants for the mobility component depending on their age at
the time of the claim.  An alternative, previously advocated by the House of Commons Work
and Pensions Committee, might be to buy out existing rights rather than to maintain multiple
transitional strands of entitlement.3  
2  Cited N Bateman, 2006, Practising welfare rights, London: Routledge, p 19.
3  House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2007, Benefits simplification,
HC 461, at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmworpen.htm
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III Operational Policy
Automatic delivery of services
21. Paragraph 3 refers to the issues raised in the claiming process.  The requirement to make a
claim is associated with a series of barriers to benefit receipt.  At times it may be appropriate
not to require the applicant to initiate a claim, but for assistance to be offered proactively (for
example by supplementing existing provision).    An experiment with the automatic delivery of
Pension Credit, delivered without requiring a prior claim, showed some improved takeup but
raised questions about the accuracy of payments.4  The example is not persuasive in itself:
Pension Credit is complex and heavily subject to error.  It does however show that automatic
delivery is both conceivable and of sufficient interest for the DWP to experiment with it.  In
the case of benefits for disability, for example, it may be possible to offer payments and
services relatively automatically for certain groups, possibly on referral by a recognised
professional, or when it appears to a responsible officer that it is appropriate to deliver the
service without waiting to be asked - as it would be in the delivery of health services.  
Fraud and error  
22. It is possible to ‘design out’ many errors (p 105).  We can see, for example, that Pension
Credit has more than fifty times the rate of error associated with Retirement Pension, a benefit
which goes to people in similar circumstances.  In relation to Pension Credit, overpayment
through fraud stands at 1.5 per cent, customer error at 1.5 per cent and official error at 2.1 per
cent, making 5.1 per cent altogether. By contrast, the equivalent figures for State Pension  are
0.0 per cent, 0.1 per cent and 0.0 per cent. (Underpayments in Pension Credit are currently
assessed at a further 2.3%.  The figures for underpayment are likely in to be an underestimate,
because DWP estimates of error exclude claimants who are denied the benefit altogether.) 
The reasons for the difference between the two lie in the complexity of the eligibility rules
(especially relating to income and capital), lack of clarity about entitlement, and the liability
that circumstances will change.  The State Pension works so much better because its purpose
is clear, it is delivered long term and it is less sensitive to individual circumstances.  If benefits
are to get to the right people, entitlement needs to be clearer and the terms on which benefits
are delivered need to be less responsive to individual difference.  This goes in the opposite
direction from many recent reforms in the UK.    
Complaints, reviews and appeals.
23. The process of review presents major difficulties.  The first problem is in establishing
contact to exchange information; the registration of online information, the closure of local
offices and increasingly restricted use of telephone contact makes it difficult to enlist the aid of
a human being.   In the new Universal Credit system, officials in Jobcentre Plus are not
4  L Radford, 2012, Quantitative evaluation of the Pension Credit Payment Study, 
Department for Work and Pensions, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214583/rrep79
6.pdf
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permitted to take or act on information from claimants, who have to be directed back to the
online system if (for example) they move house or find work.   The second problem lies in the
obstacles to internal review: officials are not trusted to correct errors.  It has long been true of
the culture of the benefits system that those who operate at the centre complain that officials
fail to comply with their instructions, while those who work in the offices have to find ways
round the inadequacies of the same centralised systems to make them work.  The tendency has
been to put the onus of making corrections on claimants: the system of ‘Mandatory
Reconsideration’ is mandatory on claimants, who have to go through the formal process of
registering a claim for consideration.   The Social Security Advisory Committee’s report on
MR identifies many of the problems with this process - for example, the need for claimants to
put in multiple requests to cover a series of decisions.5 The effect of mandating an additional
process prior to any appeal does not act to increase official scrutiny (which took place before
any appeal in the former system) but it does impose a barrier on claimants seeking redress.
Then, because this stage is a mandatory process for claimants, there is a delay in correcting
any error: barriers to access are obstacles to justice, and justice delayed is justice denied.
24. The third problem is the most fundamental.  Decisions made against a claimant are
implemented before any response or contrary case has been considered.  It is debatable
whether the way that the DWP deals with errors is lawful.  One of the central precepts of
‘natural justice’ is audi alteram partem, the principle that people must hear the arguments
against themselves and have the opportunity to respond to them.  This does not happen in
social security: sentence first, judgment afterwards.   That is why the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has just condemned aspects of the UK system for “the
absence of due process”, in breach of its obligations under the UN Charter.6  The Scottish
Parliament is responsible for legal system, and has it in its power to offer rapid and appropriate
access to judicial review of administrative action.  
Residency and cross-border issues 
25. The consultation paper asks how it can make sure that no-one is able to make a ‘double
claim’.  The UK system currently has a number of ‘income replacement ‘ benefits, preventing
people from getting more than one basic benefit.  As things stand, if the Scottish Government
awards extra payments to carers, the effect may well be to prompt deductions in other
payments.  This, rather than ‘double payment’, is what needs to be avoided.  
26. The most practical way to coordinate the efforts of the Scottish Government and the UK
system is for each to operate with minimal coordination, each disregarding income from the
5  Social Security Advisory Committee, 2016, Decision making and mandatory
reconsideration, London: SSAC.
6  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 2016, Concluding
observations on the sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  and
Northern Ireland, para 40
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12
%2fGBR%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
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other.  The point was made in para 8 that money benefits are ‘fungible’; they can be sensibly
added together from different sources, and do not need to be ‘coordinated’ in any other sense. 
Any attempt to adjust the interaction of these benefits with other benefits delivered elsewhere
and outwith the control of the Scottish Government will lead to complexities, anomalies and
potentially some perverse effects (such as the reduction of entitlement as a penalty for
attempts to increase benefits). 
Lobbying (Scotland) Act 2016.  This consultation response is by Professor Paul Spicker. 
Professor Spicker is an Emeritus Professor of the Robert Gordon University, writing and
commenting about social security policy. This submission has been prepared in an
independent capacity, and is not made for payment; consequently it does not fall within the
scope of the Lobbying (Scotland) Act 2016.  However, Professor Spicker has previously been
retained to advise and represent the interests of the Scottish Federation of Housing
Associations; as aspects of this submission overlap with that role it is proper to note the
connection here.
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